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Evidence for the UK 
 
 
Abstract 
This study presents the first empirical analysis of the determinants of firm closure in 
the UK with an emphasis on the role of export-market dynamics, using panel data for 
a nationally representative group of firms operating in all-market based sectors during 
1997-2003. Our findings show that the probability of closure is (cet. par.) 
significantly lower for exporters, particularly those experiencing export-market entry 
and exit. Having controlled for other attributes associated with productivity (such as 
size and export status), the following factors are found to increase the firm’s survival 
prospects: higher capital intensity and TFP, foreign ownership, young age, 
displacement effects (through relatively high rates of entry of firms in each industry), 
and belonging to certain industries.  Interestingly, increased import penetration (a 
proxy for lower trade costs) leads to a lower hazard rate for exporting entrants and 
continuous exporters, whilst inducing a higher hazard rate for domestic producers or 
those that quit exporting.   
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1. Introduction 
Substantial evidence of the benefits from international trade has been well 
documented in both theoretical and empirical literature, which often provides 
governments in various countries with a rationale for intervention to help firms 
develop their exporting activities when market failures are present. These benefits are 
largely linked to the higher productivity of exporters, which then contribute to overall 
UK productivity growth through various channels, such as the entry of higher 
productivity exporters (including the so-called ‘born global’ companies; see Oviatt 
and McDougal, 1995); existing exporters becoming more productive over time and/or 
intra-industry resources are reallocated to higher productivity exporters; and the 
shutdown of lower productivity firms - especially non-exporters with the lowest 
productivity levels, as predicted by some recent theoretical models (Bernard et. al., 
2003; Melitz, 2003). 
Thus it is not surprising that many government programmes aimed at export 
promotion help firms enter export markets and, given this, it is relevant to ask if (new) 
exporters will be able to enjoy better survival prospects (vis-à-vis those having not 
entered such international markets) where risk, uncertainty and competition are all 
likely to be higher. Understanding which factors determine the firm’s risk of closure 
in international markets holds the key to evaluating the efficacy of export-promotion 
policies. As pointed out by Alvarez and Lopez (2006), if survivability of businesses 
depends on trade costs, public policies might concentrate on reducing these costs.  By 
contrast, if firms’ hazard rates of closure in export markets are the result of large 
differences in productivity between exporters and non exporters, then polices that 
concentrate on facilitating entry may not generate lasting increases in export 
participation if they are not accompanied by improvements in firms’ productivity. 
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The extant theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants of plant/firm 
closure, tend to suggest that productivity and sunk costs have a major role in 
explaining shut-down decisions. Early theoretical work was particularly concerned 
with how productivity was related to initial size, the learning-by-doing effect 
associated with the age of a new entrant, and the likelihood of survival. Both initial 
size and age are positively related to survival, both in theoretical models and in the 
overwhelming majority of empirical results obtained. In addition, firms that ‘actively 
learn’ by investing in intangible assets (and consequently increase their specific 
internal capabilities and ability to absorb external knowledge) are expected to be more 
likely to survive.  
From a global perspective, firms can also acquire (external) knowledge through 
participating in export markets, so those operating in overseas markets are expected to 
have better (cet. par.) survival prospects. Exporting can also signal positive 
information about the firm, beyond measured productivity, so exporters should have a 
lower probability of failure. In contrast, the literature reviewed in the next section 
shows that higher import penetration increases the probability of closure of the least 
efficient producers, particularly those supplying domestic markets, but lowers the 
hazard rate for those firms that export (even after controlling for their higher 
productivity levels). 
Previous literature has provided both theoretical and empirical evidence on the 
determinants of firm closure and we begin with a brief overview of this literature, in 
particular emphasising the role of exporting and/or export-market dynamics in 
influencing the survivability of firms from an international perspective. Nevertheless, 
as will be seen, there is a distinctive lack of research on the impact of changing 
exporting status on the firm’ rate of survival, and to the best of our knowledge, this is 
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the first micro-based investigation in this regard using comprehensive and nationally 
representative data for the UK firms4, covering all market-based sectors. 
In particular, this paper considers whether exporting and the lowering of trade costs 
more generally impact on firm survival rates. In an attempt to add to the rather limited 
body of evidence on firm closure in the context of international trade, our results 
show that exporting firms have lower probabilities of closure, conditional on 
controlling for other factors linked to productivity. In addition, higher import 
penetration increases the probability of closure for domestic producers, but lowers the 
hazard rate for those firms that export (even after controlling for their higher 
productivity levels).   
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature 
on the determinants of firm closure, with emphasis on the role of participation in 
export markets. Section 3 describes the data sources used and presents some 
descriptive statistics, followed by an introduction to our empirical model. Our 
estimation results are discussed in Section 4, along with some further analytical 
results. The last section summarises and discusses its relevance to policy making. 
   
2. Literature review 
There are a number of theoretical and empirical models of the decision of the firm to 
shutdown some or all of its capacity. In all the decision depends fundamentally on the 
firm’s prospects for profits, and this in turn is dependent on its productivity and 
                                                 
4 Ideally we would wish to consider plant closure, as this would allow us to look at the behaviour of 
multi-plant enterprises and thus how decisions are made about changes in output capacity (including 
product lines) without necessarily ceasing production altogether. However, we do not have plant level 
data in FAME, and must therefore concentrate on an analysis at the firm level – recognising that the 
vast majority of firms are single-plant enterprises. Thus in what follows we usually refer to the firm as 
our ‘unit of analysis’. 
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whether this is above a certain shut-down threshold (defined as the lowest level of 
productivity that would enable the firm to have positive discounted expected profits 
greater than its liquidation value over future periods). Such a framework leads to 
productivity and also sunk costs having a major role in explaining closure decisions, 
and thus the internal and external factors, attached to the firm and the industry in 
which it operates, that impact on productivity and sunk costs.   
Initial, current size and age of the firm 
Early theoretical work was particularly concerned with how productivity was related 
to initial size, the learning-by-doing effect associated with the age of a new entrant, 
and the likelihood of survival. The models developed by Jovanovic (1982) and Pakes 
and Ericson (1998) are based on new enterprises entering a perfectly competitive 
industry with a time-invariant productivity level but without knowing this level and 
therefore their ‘ability’ to compete effectively; thus they face an immediate cost 
disadvantage because they typically enter below minimum efficient scale (MES), and 
then learn whether they can survive. Thus, initial size is positively related to survival 
since the greater the initial size at start-up the less the need to grow to attain the 
industry MES. These models also imply that the longer the firm stays in the market 
the more likely it is to continue to survive through learning-by-doing, and 
consequently age is negatively related to risk of closure. This relationship between 
size, age and survival is modified in Ericson and Pakes (1992) to allow firms to 
actually know their initial ability level and then post-entry invest to improve their 
performance; this strengthens the relationship between age and survival, and suggests 
that the effect of the firm’s initial size on its current size should decrease over time 
and consequently current size should be a better predictor of survival than initial size, 
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the older is the firm.5 Most empirical studies confirm the predictions of the ‘learning-
by-doing’ models. For example, Lieberman (1990) found that small firms were more 
likely to close in declining industries, while Doms et. al. (1995) and Geroski (1995) 
specifically found that larger initial size had a large, statistically significant negative 
effect on firm closure, while age was strongly negatively related to closure. Dunne et. 
al. (2005) also showed that size was negatively related to closure (but positively 
related to product-line exit). Audretsch (1994, 1995) and Bernard and Jensen (2002) 
also found initial size and the age of firms to have the predicted relationship. The age-
closure relationship is confirmed in such studies as Dunne et. al. (1989); Mata (1994); 
Mata and Portugal (1994); Mata et. al. (1995); Boeri and Bellman (1995); Cefis and 
Marsili (2006); and for the UK see Harris and Hassaszadeh (2002) and Disney et. al. 
(2003a). Few studies have tended to include both initial size and current size as 
determinants of closure probabilities. Mata et. al. (1995) found that current firm size 
improves the chances of survival but initial size was positively related to firm exit. 
They explained this counterintuitive result by stating that if a firm survives but starts 
smaller and therefore experiences faster post-entry growth, then it has a higher 
probability of survival, so the initial size effect is positive. Harris and Hassaszadeh 
(op. cit.) and Disney et. al. (op. cit.) also found that initial size had a positive effect, 
while current size had a negative impact, on firm closure. Like Mata et. al. (op. cit.), 
both studies show that the impact of initial size and current size is not independent of 
the relationship between these two variables (i.e., subsequent growth following entry) 
and therefore the probability of closure depends on whether the firm is growing or 
                                                 
5 Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985) take a different approach: they are interested in declining industries 
and exiting, and so assume all producers have equal costs but as demand diminishes the smaller 
producer, having lower output, can operate as a profitable monopolist over a longer period of time as 
demand falls. Hence, larger plants/firms exit first. However, a positive relationship between firm size 
and exit is more likely when multi-plant operations are taken into consideration (see the discussion 
below on the role of ownership and branch plants). 
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declining from their initial size (growth reduces the hazard of closing, while declining 
increases the hazard). They go even further and consider the interaction of initial and 
current size with the age of the establishment, showing that the effect of initial size 
wears off as the firm gets older, the negative impact of firm growth on the hazard of 
closure increases with age but this relationship between growth and age is non-linear 
and tapers off as the firm gets larger over time. 
Intangible assets 
Ericson and Pakes (1995) and Olley and Pakes (1996) extended Jovanovic’s model to 
include the investments of individual firms (particularly on intangible assets) to allow 
for ‘active learning’, thus relaxing the assumption that firm productivity levels are 
constant over time. According to resource-based theories of the firm, firms that invest 
in intangible assets, such as advertising, goodwill, R&D and other innovative 
activities, and consequently increase their specific internal capabilities and ability to 
absorptive external knowledge, are more likely to survive. Aw et. al. (2005) also 
allow firms to generate (external) knowledge through participating in export markets, 
so that the evolution of firm productivity over time is determined by past productivity 
as well as investments in such knowledge acquiring activities as undertaking R&D 
and exporting.6 There have been few studies that provide empirical evidence on the 
relationship between firm closure and intangible assets possessed by firms; some 
exceptions are Hall (1987), Kimura and Fujii (2003), Esteve Pérez et. al. (2004), and 
Cefis and Marsili (2006), all of who found that spending on R&D and/or innovation 
reduced the probability of closure. However, investments in intangible assets are also 
associated with uncertainty and thus a higher risk of failure in a more technologically 
                                                 
6 Note internal knowledge generation (through in-house R&D) and acquiring external expertise through 
export market participation are not necessarily independent; indeed, the productivity effect of export 
market participation is likely to depend on the firm’s in-house capability to assimilate new information 
– i.e. its absorptive capacity (see Harris and Li, 2008, for a discussion). 
 7
competitive environment, such that some of the extant literature has found that, taking 
R&D for instance, closure rates are higher in R&D intensive industries (Audretsch 
and Mahmood, 1995; Audretsch et. al., 2000; Segarra and Callejón, 2002). 
Productivity 
In addition to the learning-by-doing model of Jovanovic (1982), the model of firm and 
market dynamics developed by Hopenhayn (1992) has provided important theoretical 
underpinnings on what determines firm closure. Similar to Jovanovic, Hopenhayn 
showed that survival in a perfectly competitive industry increases with the size and 
age of the firm, and that firms with the lowest levels of productivity close first. Each 
firm’s productivity is determined by a random draw from a Markov process whereby 
higher future productivity is a function of current productivity (the distribution of 
productivity is represented by the function F(θt+1|θt) which is strictly decreasing in θt), 
such that the higher is current productivity the more likely that a firm will experience 
high productivity levels in the future. 
This implies that productivity levels are persistent, while those firms with the lowest 
levels exit the industry first (as their productivity will fall below the exit threshold). In 
addition, any cohort of continuing firms at time t will have a productivity distribution 
to the right of entering firms (the productivity distribution of the continuing cohort 
stochastically dominates), since older firms constitute a larger proportion of high 
productivity units. Thus the age of the firm and survival will be positively related. 
Similarly, firms with an initially low level of productivity experience low productivity 
in the future, and thus have a greater probability of closure; thus heterogeneity and 
persistence in the distribution of productivity implies that closing and initial 
productivity differences (as proxied by initial size) will be inversely related.  
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Sunk costs 
In addition to these similar predictions between the Jovanovic and Hopenhayn models 
with respect to the relationship between size, age and productivity levels and the 
probability of firm closure, Hopenhayn also showed that increased sunk costs played 
a key role in lowering (entry and) exit. Potential entrants into an industry must pay a 
sunk entry cost (ce), with higher levels of ce providing a barrier to entry which insulate 
incumbents from the effects of market selection based on their productivity levels 
(given that incumbents do not have to pay ce). Therefore, industries with higher ce will 
have lower probabilities of exit (and entry, given that firms only learn their 
productivity level post-entry). This further implies that the productivity differential 
between surviving and closing firms will be greater in markets with higher sunk costs, 
as higher ce reduces the closure threshold and thus firms shutting down are relatively 
more likely to be concentrated in the lowest end of the productivity distribution.  
Other have directly looked at closure and sunk costs. Dixit (1989) showed that if 
capital investments had a substantial sunk (as opposed to just a fixed) cost component 
and demand was uncertain then firms would wait longer before entering a market and 
once there would wait longer before closing, even if they were incurring losses (van 
Ewijk, 1997, provided corroborating evidence in his theoretical model of entry and 
exit). Doms et. al. (1995) also made the argument that plants with higher capital-
labour ratios might have a lower ratio of variable to fixed costs, and would therefore 
remain in operation as long as variable costs were covered after experiencing negative 
demand shocks. There is supporting empirical evidence of a positive relationship 
between sunk costs and survival in a small number of studies, although Siegfried and 
Evans (1994) were not able to point to many when surveying early attempts at 
establishing the role of sunk costs. In contrast, Audretsch (1994), Doms et. al. (1995), 
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Kleijweg and Lever (1996) and Bernard and Jensen (2002) all reported a significant 
negative relationship between capital intensity and firm closure.  Harris and 
Hassaszadeh (2002) showed that the impact of sunk costs (as proxied by the capital-
labour ratio) was important but needed to take account of age effects; i.e. there was 
only a negative relationship between sunk costs and closure as a plant aged. This 
accorded with the results presented in Colombo and Delmastro, (2000, 2001) and 
suggested that shut-down decisions were much more irreversible in older plants who 
had become attached to an industry, while younger, more capital intensive plants 
might be exhibiting higher fixed (as opposed to sunk) costs and therefore had more 
flexibility to leave.7 Lastly, Hölzl (2005) had also tested for the impact of sunk costs 
associated with intangible assets (proxied by advertising intensity) as well as tangible 
sunk costs (associated with capital intensity), finding (somewhat unexpectedly) that 
intangible assets were associated with a higher rate of failure (Kimura and Fujii, 2003, 
also found a positive relationship between advertising intensity and closure for Japan).  
Exporting activities 
The decision of closure of exporting firms, depends mainly on industrial 
characteristics such as the level of sunk costs, and as with the case of closure in 
normal markets, the minimum productivity or efficiency needed to secure non-
negative profits (Das et. al., 2001; Bernard and Jensen, 2004a). Hopenhayn’s (1992) 
model has been adapted and extended to include trade (e.g. Melitz, 2003) and to allow 
for the impact of market size on firm turnover (e.g. Asplund and Nocke, 2006). Melitz 
allowed for monopolistic competition and introduced trade costs (and in particular 
that firms that exported faced additional sunk costs when entering international 
                                                 
7 The resale value of their capital equipment may be much higher, since irreversibility is known to 
increase with the product- and firm-specific nature of investments, which are likely to be strongly 
associated with the vintage of the plant. See below for more on the role of fixed (as opposed to sunk) 
costs. 
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markets), showing that this induced only the most productive firms to export and 
simultaneously caused firms with the lowest levels of productivity to exit. Thus, 
Bernard and Jensen (2002) noted that “… to the extent that exporting signals positive 
information about the plant, beyond measured productivity, we would expect current 
period exporters to have a lower probability of failure” (p.8). In related, and more 
recent work, Bernard et. al. (2005) developed a model of comparative advantage with 
exporting, with monopolistic competition and firms with heterogeneous levels of 
productivity. Again only the most productive firms were able to overcome sunk costs 
when producing for international markets, while trade liberalisation resulted in 
increased competition both home and abroad. The result was higher exit rates for 
firms that had the lowest productivity in domestic markets; some exporters with 
relatively low levels of productivity ceased to export (although the closure rate for 
former exporters would be lower than for non-exporters, given their on average higher 
levels of productivity vis-à-vis domestic producers); and some firms with high levels 
of productivity started to export (given access to larger markets).  
Evidence on whether exporting firms have lower probabilities of closure, conditional 
on controlling for other factors linked to productivity, is beginning to emerge. Bernard 
and Jensen (2002) found that exporting reduced plant closure in the U.S. by as much 
as 15% (after accounting for the impacts of size, productivity, factor intensity, and 
ownership structure). Hölzl (2005) confirmed that exporting reduced closure for 
Austrian manufacturing, while exporting firms in Spain experienced a 28% lower 
probability of failure when compared to non-exporters (Esteve Pérez et. al., 2004). 
Kimura and Fujii (2003) and Sabuhoro et. al. (2006) also confirm the positive 
relationship between exporting and survival for Japanese and Canadian manufacturing 
and service sector firms, respectively.  
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Trade costs and import penetration 
As well as exporting impacting on the probability of closure, globalisation and 
liberalisation of markets has resulted in greater levels of import penetration. 
Reductions in trade costs results in both increases in exports and imports (Brander, 
1995; Melitz, 2003; Bernard et. al., 2005), with increased import competition 
increasing the probability of closure of the least efficient producers, particularly those 
supplying the domestic market. In addition to domestic producers facing greater 
competition, when there is higher intra-industry trade associated with differentiated 
products, this results in different survival thresholds in industries/countries with 
different efficiency levels, increasing the risk of closure for weaker firms in those 
sectors with the most heterogeneous products (Faley et. al., 2004). It is also likely 
(based on the technology transfer literature and also anticipating our empirical results 
later on), that firms that export in these differentiated markets (with potentially higher 
levels of import penetration) may actually benefit from increased imports of 
(intermediate) goods and services (which presumably brings with it potentially higher 
levels of technology transfer through access to a wider stock of knowledge – cf. 
Ethier, 1982; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; and Eaton and Kortum, 2001, 2002). 
High import penetration may therefore increase the probability of closure for 
domestic producers, but lower the hazard rate for those firms that export (even after 
controlling for their higher productivity levels).   
Evidence of the impact of higher import penetration on firm closure is also relatively 
new; e.g., Gullstrand (2005) found that imports increased the probability of closure in 
Swedish textiles, but the impact was moderated in those sub-groups with higher levels 
of intra-industry trade. Baggs (2005) found that Canadian tariff reductions increased 
the hazard rate of closure for Canadian firms (U.S. reductions had the opposite 
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effect); however, Hölzl (2005) found import growth had an insignificant effect on exit 
(and entry) in Austria. Hölzl attempted to rationalise his results by noting that “… a 
possible explanation … may be the fact that in Austria manufacturers are often at the 
same time recipients and distributors of imported goods” (p. 2439). Earlier evidence 
of higher imports increasing closure rates is provided by Bernard and Jenson (2002) 
for U.S. manufacturers (although their significant effects related to imports from low 
wage countries increasing hazard rates); von der Fehr (1991) for Norway and 
Angostaki and Louri (1995) for Greece also found the expected impact of imports on 
closure rates.  
Asplund and Nocke (2006) extended Hopenhayn’s (1992) model by allowing for 
imperfect competition, finding that firm turnover (entry and closure) increase with 
market size, with the net effect of a higher rate of failure for less productive firms and 
a lower rate of closure for the most productive enterprises. They also were able to 
distinguish between the impact of sunk and fixed costs, finding that sunk costs lower 
the probability of closure (as above) while higher fixed costs lowers the probability of 
failure for the most efficient firms (as they gain more from higher prices) but 
increases closure for less efficient firms (who have to meet a higher close-down 
threshold and so more shutdown).  
Foreign ownership 
Moreover, the importance of ownership in determining the probability of survival has 
also been well documented in the literature8. With respect to country of ownership, 
distance effects may make it more likely that overseas companies find it less 
                                                 
8 Since our data is at the firm level, and in addition does not allow us to track ownership changes over 
time, we limit our discussion here to just those aspects that can be incorporated into our study. Thus the 
evidence on plant status (single-plant enterprises versus multi-plant) and changes in ownership 
(acquisitions by foreign- or domestically-owned firms) are not included in here (rather see Bernard and 
Jensen, 2002, for the U.S. and Harris and Hassaszadeh, 2002, for the UK). 
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problematic if needing to close capacity in host countries. In contrast, if foreign-
owned subsidiaries have access to superior foreign technologies and other proprietary 
assets available from the multinational enterprise, this would suggest that such firms 
will have higher productivity and thus a higher probability of survival. In addition, the 
model of asset-seeking FDI (cf. Dunning, 1998; Wesson, 1999) suggests that foreign-
owned firms hope to create advantages for themselves through acquiring and 
internalising valuable assets in the host nation and thus they will wish to establish 
capacity in the host nation by acquiring firms with comparatively superior 
productivity levels and with technological characteristics that match more closely 
with their own use of technology (e.g., capital- and intermediate input intensive). 
Otherwise, such FDI involves excessive costs when adapting and modifying the 
acquired firm’s use of different technology, when gaining expertise and experience in 
the host market, and when building up trust in order to gain from the internal market 
operated by the larger post-acquisition enterprise.  
In terms of empirical evidence, Dunning (1998) and Wesson (1999) looked at foreign-
owned plants in the Northern region of England and found country of ownership was 
not important as a determinant of closure. Colombo and Delmastro (2000) found a 
strong, positive effect between foreign ownership and plant closure for Italian 
metalworking plants in 1986, while Görg and Strobl (2003) for Ireland, Bernard and 
Sjöholm (2003) for Indonesia, Esteve Pérez et. al. (2004) for Spain, and Gullstrand 
(2005) for Sweden all found a greater probability of closure for foreign-owned plants 
compared to domestically-owned ones. By contrast, both Li and Guisinger (1991) for 
the U.S. and Mata and Portugal (2002, 2004) for Portugal found the opposite result, 
while Harris and Hassaszadeh (2002) found that overall UK plants that belonged to 
the foreign-owned sector were generally less likely to shutdown, but that this 
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diminished with the age of the plant. Note, most of this evidence relates to plants and 
not firms, and thus may conflate the separate effects of foreign-owned firms having a 
higher likelihood of closing plants (especially in assembly units in peripheral, lower 
cost regions) but overall maintaining high levels of productivity within the firm.  
Productivity  
A number of studies have incorporated direct measures of profitability (or 
productivity) when attempting to explain closure, rather than just relying on size and 
age variables to proxy for relative costs. Siegfried and Evans (1994) found that many 
early studies (often using aggregated industry-level data) were not successful at 
linking profitability to closure, often because of collinearity with measures such as 
sunk costs. Kleijweg and Lever (1996) also found profitability insignificant. In 
contrast, total factor productivity was strongly, negatively related to closure in the 
studies by Doms et. al. (1995); Kovenock and Phillips (1997), Bernard and Jensen 
(2002), and Harris and Hassaszadeh (2002) 9 , 10  leading them to conclude that 
relatively less efficient firms closed first (or that firms closed relatively less efficient 
                                                
plants).  
Displacement effect 
Closure may also occur when firms are displaced by more efficient new entrants, 
resulting in the often reported stylised fact that entry and exit appear to be strongly 
correlated over time. Gabszewicz and Thisse (1980) provided a theoretical 
justification while, for example, Caves and Porter (1977), Geroski (1991), Baldwin 
(1995), Dunne et. al. (1988), Mata and Portugal (1994), Boeri and Bellman (1995) 
 
9 Harris and Hassaszadeh (op. cit.) found that UK plants with lower technical efficiency (their proxy 
for productivity) had a higher probability of closure, but this negative relationship declined with the 
age of the plant. 
10 Dunne et. al. (2005) for the U.S. and Gullstrand (2005) for textiles in Sweden used a labour 
productivity measure, with an expected negative sign obtained. 
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Ilmakunnas and Topi (1999), and Harris and Hassaszadeh (2002) all provided 
empirical support that (lagged) entry positively determined closures (although the 
effect was not always statistically significant).  
Macroeconomic influences and output growth 
Lastly, the state of the business cycle should impact on the hazard of plant closure 
(e.g., van Ewijk, 1997). Growth in real GDP is expected to reduce the number of 
closures as profitability rises, but downturns in aggregate demand may be asymmetric 
since entry and exit are strongly correlated. Nevertheless, falls in profitability are 
expected to increase the rate of bankruptcies (albeit in a biased direction towards 
smaller enterprises). The empirical evidence is mixed; for example, Kovenock and 
Phillips (1997) found that capacity utilisation had the expected negative and 
statistically significant relationship with plant closures, but changes in output demand 
were not significant. Mata et. al. (1995) found that high industry growth lowered 
hazard rates, but that industries with high growth and high entry rates had higher 
hazard rates. Lieberman (1990) did not find capacity utilisation to be important, while 
Boeri and Bellman (1995, p. 493) stated that "... all in all, even after controlling for 
industry heterogeneity and displacement effects, cyclical factors do not seem to affect 
the pace of exit" (italics in original). Ilmakunnas and Topi (1999) specifically 
compared the microeconomic and macroeconomic influences on entry and exit, and 
conclude that macroeconomic factors explain entry fairly well, but exits much less so. 
Harris and Hassaszadeh (2002) found that expansion within an industry provided UK 
plants with a cushion against the risk of closure, but only for plants that had been in 
operation for 10 years or more; younger plants faced a higher hazard rate of failure 
when industry growth was relatively high suggesting that such high growth may 
attract too many young plants that turn out not to be viable. Likewise, Disney et. al. 
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(2003b) found manufacturing output growth to be insignificant in determining the 
hazard of closure, except when it also entered as a joint-variable with plant age. Then 
increases in demand were still positively associated with closure, but the joint 
demand-age variable was statistically significantly negative (although smaller in value 
than the direct impact of demand on closing). Dunne et. al. (2005) for U.S. 
manufacturing found a negative relationship between growth in demand and plant 
 
rms that overcome entry barriers into overseas markets have lower rates of closure.  
 
                                                
closure, while Baggs (2005) reports a similar result for Canadian industries.  
In summary, this selective review of what is a large literature shows that past 
theoretical and empirical studies have set out to test several hypotheses concerning the 
determinants of firm closure such as: the age of the enterprise; its size (initial and 
current); sunk costs (including intangible costs); productivity; ownership; the 
displacement effects of new entry; and the state of the business cycle.11 However, 
there has been less attention given in the literature to the effects of exporting and the 
associated export-market dynamics, and this is the particular focus of the present 
study. In particular, we are interested in obtaining evidence for the UK as to whether
fi
3. The data and empirical model 
The FAME dataset for 1996-2004 is used for this study, which includes all firms 
operating in the UK that are required to make a return to Companies House. It 
contains basic information on firm-specific characteristics, such as turnover, 
intermediate expenditure, employment, assets, and most importantly, overseas sales. 
Apart from financial information, FAME also has information on the year of 
 
11 Other factors also feature, such as changes in ownership, the relationship between firms and plants, 
product differentiation, market size, and the wider effects of trade liberalisation. However, we 
concentrate here on those factors we can control for using the FAME database. 
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incorporation of the company, postcodes, the 4-digit 2003 SIC industry code, and 
country of ownership. Note, we only use data containing unconsolidated accounts, to 
avoid double counting and within firm transfer effects. Our final dataset used for 
statistical analysis comprises of an unbalanced panel, containing 91,701 firms with 
 the 
Figure 1: Closure ratea by employment size-band in UK market-based sectors, 1997-2003 
                                                
247,028 observations during 1997-2003.12  
The FAME dataset is severely biased towards large enterprises, and thus is 
unrepresentative of UK firms. To obtain a distribution representative of the population 
of firms operating in the UK, we treat the firms in the FAME dataset as a sample of 
the nationally-representative Annual Respondents database (or ARD) population13 , 
and consequently weight the FAME data to produce a representative database (by 
industry and firm size). In practice, we have obtained aggregated turnover data from 
the ARD sub-divided into 5 size-bands (based on turnover quintiles) and 3-digit 
industry SICs14. We then aggregate the FAME data into the same sub-groups, so that 
we can calculate weights using the total turnover data from the ARD divided by the 
comparable data from FAME. In essence, the FAME dataset is weighted to acquire the 
same distribution of turnover as those firms in the ARD. 15  Table A.1 (in
Appendix) provides the relevant evidence and validates our weighting approach. 
 
12 The first year of data (1996) is ‘lost’ as we include industry growth rates as one of our determining 
variables (thus 1996 growth cannot be computed without 1995 data). The last year of data (2004) is 
also omitted as in 2004 all firms ‘exit’ in this year (i.e. the data is right-censored).  
13 For a details description of the ARD (available at the ONS), see Oulton (1997), Griffith (1999) and 
Harris (2005). 
14 Where there are fewer than 10 enterprises in any sub-group, these data are not used, so as to avoid 
disclosure of confidential information in these ONS data. This results in a loss of some 4% of the total 
turnover available in the ARD.  
15 Note we do not weight the FAME data for 34 industries because the FAME data have better coverage 
in terms of total turnover than the ARD. These 34 industries (out of 215 in total) account for just 2.9% 
of total FAME turnover. Note also, the ARD does not contain data for Northern Ireland but since this 
region is rather small it will not have much of an effect in the weights used. 
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a Proportion of firms closing per annum. 
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Note, a Cox regression-based test for the equality of the survival curves for these employment size-
band groups rejects the null at > 1% significance level.        
Source: weighted FAME data 
Figure 1 presents the closure rate of firms in the dataset, with separate rates for 
different enterprise size. Overall, there was a relatively stable rate of closure of some 
24% of firms between 1997-2002, rising to 31% in 2003. The smallest firms (in terms 
of their employment) had the highest rates of closure (28% for those employing under 
10 vis-à-vis an average of 13% for firms with 200+ employees), and generally more 
stable patterns over time. Definitions of the variables used to estimate a model of 
closure are presented in Table 1. Information on (weighted) means and standard 
deviations for each variable are also provided, divided into 5 sub-groups depending 
on the exporting status of the firm. These show that firms that exported at some time 
during the period tended to be  slightly younger  (except  for  those  that entered 
exporting); they were much more likely to be foreign-owned; slightly more likely to 
have non-zero intangible assets; operate in industries experiencing on average lower 
growth in output and less displacement (except for firms that both entered and exited 
from exporting); they had higher levels of both initial and current employment; higher 
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relative total factor productivity; and higher capital intensity (except for firms new to 
exporting). In all, there is evidence that exporting firms have many of the 
characteristics associated with lower unconditional hazard rates of closure. 
Figure 2 confirms that the baseline survival functions (h0(t) in Equation (2) below16) 
for firms that enter and/or exit overseas markets are indeed considerably higher; 
however, there is little difference in the baseline survival functions of firms that are 
continuous exporters versus non-exporters. Thus, it is of interest to consider whether 
the covariates in the model to be estimated point towards any movement away from 
these baseline functions (and more particularly towards lower hazard ratios for the 
continuous exporter sub-group). 
 
16 Note, the baseline survivor functions in Figure 2 are equivalent to “covariate-adjusted” Kaplan-Meier 
estimates; if x(t) in equation (2) below was zero, then we would have the usual Kaplan-Meier estimates 
functions (which do not have as smooth an appearance as in Figure 2). In fact, the functions shown 
used the estimated β to put all firms on the same level by adjusting for the covariates, before 
proceeding with the Kaplan-Meier calculations.  
Table 1: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics a, by exporting status 
Variable Definition Never exported Always exported 
(EXP_always) 
Entered exporting 
(EXP_entry) 
Exited exporting 
(EXP_exit) 
Entered/exited 
exporting 
(EXP_both) 
All firms 
   Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
AGEit 
 
Age of firm (t minus year 
opened + 1) in years 16.6 17.2 20.7† 19.7 14.5 14.9 19.4† 17.5 18.8† 17.8 17.0 17.4 
FOit 
 
Dummy coded 1 if firm i is 
foreign-owned at time t 0.039 0.194 0.206† 0.405 0.198† 0.399 0.171† 0.377 0.213† 0.409 0.062 0.242 
INTGBLit 
 
 
Dummy coded 1 if firm i 
has non-zero intangible 
assets at time t 0.115 0.319 0.160† 0.367 0.157† 0.364 0.133† 0.339 0.146† 0.353 0.120 0.325 
ln GROWTHtb 
 
Growth in industry real 
gross output, t-1 to t -0.026 0.194 -0.028‡ 0.207 -0.030‡ 0.180 -0.029‡ 0.178 -0.036‡ 0.207 -0.026 0.195 
ln DISPLACEtb 
 
 
Employment of new 
entrants ÷ employment of 
existing firms in time t -4.51 3.33 -4.62‡ 3.20 -4.91‡ 3.04 -5.05‡ 3.16 -4.31‡ 3.18 -4.53 3.31 
ln OPENi 
 
Employment in firm i in 
year first observed 2.10 1.32 3.05† 1.65 2.53† 1.46 2.82† 1.58 2.83† 1.63 2.22 1.40 
ln TFPit 
 
Relative TFP in firm i at 
time t (see appendix for 
details) -0.172 0.452 -0.064† 0.313 -0.120† 0.450 -0.128† 0.442 -0.142† 0.472 -0.160 0.442 
ln KLit 
 
Tangible assets-to-labour 
ratio for firm i in time t 1.93 1.90 1.94† 1.50 1.87 1.51 2.05† 1.93 2.12† 1.74 1.94 1.86 
ln EMPit 
 
Current employment in firm 
i in time t 2.14 1.34 3.08† 1.66 2.70† 1.51 2.48† 1.48 2.70† 1.58 2.25 1.41 
ln HERFit 
 
Industry (2-digit) Herfindahl 
index in time t -4.675 0.841 -4.295† 0.895 -4.413† 0.849 -4.481† 0.827 -4.342† 0.919 -4.626 0.856 
ln IMPit Import penetration in time tc 0.234 2.140 1.563† 2.182 1.568† 2.064 1.372† 1.926 1.410† 1.993 0.420 2.185 
              
a In addition the variables entering the model included 33 industry dummies at the 2-digit (SIC 2003) level and 11 Government Office region dummies (as well as composite dummies involving 
the AGE variable and export status) 
b Calculated separately for each 3-digit industrial sector. 
c Source: Table 3.6 in 2006 UK Input-Output Tables (ONS, 2006)  
†(‡) p-value > 0.01 of Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejecting null that the distribution of ‘never exported’ sub-group of firms lies to the right (left) of tested sub-group.  
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 Figure 2: Baseline survival functionsa for exporting and non-exporting firms in UK market-
based sectors, 1997-2003 
a Obtained from estimating equation 2. 
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Note, a Cox regression-based test for the equality of the survival curves for these exporting sub-groups 
rejects the null at > 1% significance level. 
 
In order to model the determinants of firm closure, and defining the hazard rate of 
firm i as the probability that it shuts down in time t having survived until t, the hazard 
function h( ) is given by: 
h(t; X(t)) = P[firm at t | survival to t; X(t)] = P[T = t | T ≥ t, X(t)]         (1) 
 
where X(t) is the covariate path of x up to t. We choose to estimate a Cox proportional 
hazard model (Cox 1972, 1975): 
 
h(t) = h0(t) exp(x(t) β)               (2) 
 
which comprises a parameterised function of firm characteristics, exp(x(t)β); and a 
non-parametric base-line hazard, h0(t), as this is preferable to specifying a functional 
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form such as the Weibull distribution, which may lead to misspecification of the 
baseline hazard function. Such a semi-parametric model is more flexible than other 
alternative specifications, and in our empirical work we found the results to be more 
plausible when compared to parametric modelling of the baseline hazard17. Given the 
need to meet the proportional hazard assumption, we allowed the baseline hazard to 
differ for 3 sub-groups based on allocating firms in time t to whether the industry they 
belonged to had >30%, 10-30% or <10% of firms engaged in exporting. 
The Cox proportional hazards model in STATA (version 9) was used to obtain 
estimates, and the actual modelling strategy used was to start with a simple model 
(referred to as Model 1 and involving only the key variables, including exporting 
defined as a dummy variable taking on a value of 1 if the firm exported in time t), and 
then allow for different types of export status (Model 2), before entering variables 
multiplied by ‘age’,18 and excluding insignificant cross-product variables involving 
the age variable (Model 3). We then allowed all the variables in the model to enter for 
a third time having been multiplied by the 4 exporting sub-groups outlined in Table 1, 
and dropping all cross-product terms involving age and these export sub-groups that 
were insignificant (Model 4). The results for Models 1 – 4 are given in Table 2. The 
‘restricted model’ approach was checked against ‘full model’ by testing whether the  
 
17 In order to assess the appropriateness of various assumptions on the underlying distributions, as a 
preliminary visual analysis, we have plotted the estimated integrated hazard function for generalised 
residuals; and by comparing this with the actual integrated hazard for the assumed distribution, we are 
able to show that neither the Weibull nor exponential distribution is in line with our data specification. 
As robustness checks, we have also attempted modelling the baseline hazard in a parametric setting; 
nevertheless, alternative parametric models fail to generate plausible results. Therefore, we conclude 
the proportional hazard model is a valid approach to estimating our hazard function. 
18 As Disney et. al. (2003a) point out: “… with the Cox specification, we cannot enter age directly 
since it is collinear with the baseline hazard. We could enter age directly if we adopted a parametric 
specification for the baseline, but we would then be relying on identification of the age effect from the 
assumed functional form” (p.105). 
Table 2: Parameter estimates of the (stratified) weighted hazard model for UK firms in market-based sectors, 1997-2003 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable βˆ βˆ βˆ z-valuea  z-value  z-value βˆ  z-value exp( )-1 βˆ
FOit -0.223 -4.79 -0.195 -4.27 -0.193 -4.23 -0.131 -2.21 -0.123 
INTGBLit 0.032 0.72 0.034 0.76 0.035 0.79 0.040 0.90 0.041 
ln GROWTHt 0.221 2.59 0.221 2.62 0.103 0.92 0.097 0.85 0.102 
ln KLit -0.039 -5.13 -0.038 -5.00 -0.050 -4.85 -0.048 -4.59 -0.047 
ln DISPLACEt -0.009 -1.94 -0.010 -1.97 -0.010 -1.98 -0.009 -1.92 -0.009 
ln OPENi 0.095 4.25 0.106 4.50 0.103 4.38 0.098 3.82 0.103 
ln EMPit -0.237 -11.12 -0.246 -11.00 -0.242 -10.87 -0.223 -9.03 -0.198 
ln TFPit -0.062 -1.93 -0.068 -2.12 -0.068 -2.11 -0.072 -2.46 -0.069 
ln HERFt 0.030 1.08 0.032 1.14 -0.000 -0.01 -0.004 -0.11 -0.004 
ln IMPt 0.007 0.60 0.010 0.93 0.010 0.91 0.029 2.62 0.019 
EXPORTit -0.121 -3.76 − − − − − − − 
EXP_alwaysit − − -0.006 -0.19 -0.000 -0.02 0.343 4.53 0.409 
EXP_entryit − − -0.669 -10.87 -0.810 -9.26 -0.756 -5.09 -0.530 
EXP_exitit − − -0.525 -6.16 -0.681 -5.18 -0.256 -1.80 -0.226 
EXP_bothit − − -1.018 -9.54 -1.021 -9.56 -1.052 -9.83 -0.651 
ln GROWTHt × AGEit − − − − 0.009 2.03 0.009 2.04 0.009 
ln KLit × AGEit − − − − 0.001 2.11 0.001 2.36 0.001 
ln HERFt × AGEit − − − − 0.002 2.41 0.002 2.48 0.002 
EXP_entryit × AGEit − − − − 0.009 2.40 0.011 2.76 0.011 
EXP_exitit × AGEit − − − − 0.008 2.49 0.010 2.82 0.010 
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FOit × EXP_alwaysit − − − − − − -0.172 -2.04 -0.158 
ln KLit ×  EXP_ alwaysit − − − − − − -0.031 -1.69 -0.030 
ln OPENi ×  EXP_ alwaysit − − − − − − 0.066 1.48 0.068 
ln EMPit × EXP_ alwaysit  − − − − − − -0.169 -3.83 -0.156 
ln TFPit × EXP_ alwaysit − − − − − − -0.213 -3.01 -0.192 
ln IMPt × EXP_ alwaysit − − − − − − -0.027 -2.09 -0.027 
FOit × EXP_exitit − − − − − − -0.459 -1.90 -0.368 
ln EMPit ×  EXP_exitit − − − − − − -0.156 -3.40 -0.145 
ln TFPit ×  EXP_entryit − − − − − − -0.155 -2.29 -0.143 
ln IMPt ×  EXP_entryit − − − − − − -0.072 -2.29 -0.070 
ln KLit ×  EXP_entryit − − − − − − -0.107 -2.13 -0.101 
ln OPENi ×  EXP_entryit − − − − − − -0.142 -1.73 -0.133 
ln EMPit ×  EXP_entryit − − − − − − 0.177 2.14 0.194 
ln IMPt ×  EXP_entryit − − − − − − -0.030 -1.98 -0.029 
ln GROWTHt ×  EXP_entryit − − − − − − 0.677 1.80 0.967 
2-digit SIC industry dummies YES  YES  YES  YES   
          
Log likelihood -467,195.75  -466,799.48  -466,744.53  -466,592.94   
Cox-Snell Psuedo-R2 0.243  0.244  0.245  0.246   
Link testb : H0: β2 = 0  0.97  0.60  0.27  0.65   
Sig. level. omitted cross-product terms H0: Σβi = 0    0.61  0.15   
No. of observations = 247,028;  no. of firms = 91,701; no. of closures observed = 61,482 
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a  Based on robust standard errors;  
bTests of model misspecification are based on log relative hazard = . Under the correct specification, β1 = 1 and β2 = 0; thus we test β2 = 0.  The significance 
level for rejecting the null is reported here. 
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omitted parameter estimates were jointly zero (significance levels are reported for 
Models 3 and 4 in Table 2, showing that dropping jointly insignificant variables is 
accepted). We also report a pseudo Cox-Snell R2 test statistic, based  on a likelihood ratio 
test that the remaining parameter estimates are jointly non-zero (Sabuhoro et. al., 2006, 
p.63 provide more details), and the results from a ‘link test’ that tests whether squared 
values of the model’s explanatory variables are  jointly  significant  (which would suggest  
that  the model is  mis-specified). Details of this test are provided in Cleves et. al. (2002, 
Chapter 11). In summary, the models estimated appear to be adequate for analysing the 
determinants of firm closure using the (weighted) FAME dataset. 
 
4. The results 
The results for Model 1 in Table 2 show that firms that exported at some time during 
1997-2003 had a statistically significant lower probability of closure.  However,  the  
hazard  rate  ( )  for this variable  is  not  large;  it shows that firms were 11.4% less 
likely to shutdown if they exported, conditional on having controlled for other covariates. 
Model 2 produces more details for the various exporting sub-groups, showing that those 
that exported continuously were not significantly more likely to survive, but firms that 
entered and/or exited export markets had much lower hazard rates. Model 3 confirms 
these differences across the various exporting sub-groups, and also shows that certain 
variables (including exporting status) impact on the probability of closure with differing 
effects depending on the age of the firm.  Finally,  Model 4  provides  the most detailed 
set of results since it allows for ‘age’ and ‘exporting’ to have a differential impact 
combined with the other variables in the model. This is our preferred model. 
1ˆ −βe
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Table 3: Changes in (marginal) weighted hazard rate of closure for continuous exporters by firm 
characteristics, 1997-2003 
Hazard ratea (deciles) ln KL ln OPEN ln TFP ln EMP ln IMP FO 
less than -0.327 2.89 5.67 0.14 5.96 2.46 0.45 
-0.327 to -0.242 2.55 4.22 0.08 4.38 2.59 0.37 
-0.242 to -0.191 2.29 3.82 0.04 3.93 2.44 0.25 
-0.191 to -0.147 2.27 3.53 0.00 3.60 2.06 0.22 
-0.147 to -0.098 2.09 3.06 -0.02 3.09 1.96 0.26 
-0.098 to -0.048 1.97 2.79 -0.03 2.81 1.42 0.21 
-0.048 to 0.019 1.98 2.56 -0.09 2.52 1.25 0.14 
0.019 to 0.093 1.36 2.18 -0.11 2.15 1.14 0.11 
0.093 to 0.210 1.24 1.80 -0.18 1.71 0.86 0.05 
more than 0.021 0.85 1.32 -0.48 1.09 0.00 0.03 
a This is calculated as e(0.343 – 0.17×FO – 0.031×lnKL + 0.066×lnOPEN – 0.213×lnTFP – 0.169×lnEMP – 0.027×lnIMP) – 1 
Figure 3: Changes in (marginal) weighted hazard ratea of closure for exporters, 1997-2003 
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a continuous exporters = e(0.343 – 0.17×FO – 0.031×lnKL + 0.066×lnOPEN – 0.213×lnTFP – 0.169×lnEMP – 0.027×lnIMP) – 1 
entered exporting = e(– 0.756+0.011×AGE – 0.107×lnKL – 0.142×lnOPEN + 0.177×lnEMP  – 0.030×lnIMP) – 1 
exited exporting = e(– 0.256+0.010×AGE – 0.459×FO – 0.156×lnEMP– 0.155×lnTFP – 0.072×lnIMP) – 1 
entered/exited exporting = e(– 1.052+ 0.677×lnGROWTH) – 1 
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Figure 4: Changes in weighted hazard ratea of closure for various sub-groups, 1997-2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a continuous non-exporters = ea–1 where ea=e[–0.131×FO+0.040×INTGBL+0.097×lnGROWTH–0.048×lnKL–0.009×lnDISPLACE+ 
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entered/exited exporting = e(a – 1.052+ 0.677×lnGROWTH) – 1 
 
The first major result reported in Model 4 is that, cet. par., the dummy variable for 
continuous exporters indicates a higher likelihood of firm closure (almost 41% higher, 
based on the last column which reports hazard rates). However, the variable EXP_always 
also enters the model jointly with a number of other covariates; thus Table 3 presents the 
deciles of the hazard rate for this variable, and provides for each decile the mean values 
of those variables linked to EXP_always. The (marginal) probability of closure is 
negative for firms up to the 70% decile, showing that for these sub-groups (covering 
nearly 70% of all continuous exporters) the negative impacts on the hazard rate of higher 
capital-intensity, larger employment size, higher relative TFP, and foreign ownership are 
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sufficiently strong to counterbalance the positive value attached to the EXP_always 
dummy variable.19 Put another way, for those sub-groups with negative hazard rates, the 
values of ln KL, ln OPEN, ln TFP, ln EMP, and FO are relatively large, ensuring that 
overall hazard rates are negative and thus the majority of firms engaged in continuous 
exporting have a lower probability of closure. 
Other exporting sub-groups had unambiguously lower hazard rates: Figure 3 plots these 
showing that the average firm that entered overseas markets during 1997-2003 was 
52.2% less likely to close; the average firm that ceased exporting was 43.9% less likely to 
close; while those firms that both entered and exited from export markets were 64.8% 
less likely to shutdown.  
For completeness, we also report the hazard rates for all sub-groups of firms (aggregated 
into deciles). Figure 2 shows that the baseline survival functions for the continuous 
exporting and non-exporting groups are very similar. These (natural) survival rates 
represent the inverse of the baseline hazard, h0(t), while Figure 4 shows how the 
covariates shift firms away from these baseline hazards. Comparing continuous exporters 
and non-exporters, it can be seen that the former have relatively (much) lower hazard 
rates up to the 70% decile, after which there is little difference in the probability of 
closure. In summary, the overwhelming majority of firms that exported had lower hazard 
rates than non-exporters, and these rates were much lower for firms that entered and/or 
exited overseas markets. For new exporters, this may reflect not only the initial high 
productivity that comes with exporting, but also the increase in resources and capabilities 
                                                 
19 The role of larger ‘opening’ and ‘current’ employment size, leading to overall negative impacts on the 
hazard rate (based on Mata et. al. 1995) is discussed later. Note, also that the impact of import penetration 
for the continuous exporting sub-group is overall neutral (the composite dummy variable largely negates 
the effect shown through the parameter estimate of ln IMPt). 
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that are needed prior to overcoming barriers to exporting; for firms that cease exporting, 
their lower hazard rate may reflect a positive outcome of engaging in a decision making 
process that results in the firm concentrating on domestic production. 
The results from Model 4 in Table 2 also show that foreign-owned subsidiaries in the 
benchmark sub-group were (cet. par.) 12.3% less likely to close; those that always 
exported had a 28.1% lower hazard rate, while firms that ceased exporting and were also 
foreign-owned were 49.1% less likely to close. The latter sub-group include the UK 
subsidiaries of MNE’s that ceased exporting once they had set up new subsidiaries in 
those countries they previously exported to from the UK. Overall, our results are 
therefore consistent with foreign-owned subsidiaries gaining from access to superior 
technologies and practices transferred from the parent MNE. In addition, we find that 
having positive intangible assets had no significant impact on the hazard rate20. Recall 
that there have been mixed results in previous studies with respect to the impact of the 
intangibles, given that it can also be associated with failure attached to a higher risk, as 
well as enhancing the firm’s internal capabilities (e.g R&D and innovation). With regard 
to displacement effects (through relatively high rates of entry of firms in each industry), a 
one standard deviation increase in ln DISPLACE (see Table 1) actually decreases the 
probability of closure by nearly 3% rather than leading to displacement of existing firms. 
Having controlled for other attributes associated with productivity (such a size and export 
status), our results confirm previous studies which show that firms with higher total 
factor productivity are less likely to close; in this study, a one standard deviation increase 
in ln TFP reduces the hazard rate by 3.1%.  
                                                 
20 We also included ln (1 + real value of intangible assets) instead of INTGBL, as a check on whether the 
volume of assets was more important, but the results were even less significant. 
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As to the impact of import penetration on the probability of closure, the results from 
Model 4 show that for non-exporters and those firms that exited from exporting increases 
in imports lead to a higher hazard rate (a one standard deviation in ln IMP of around 1.9 
for these firms increased the probability of closure by 3.6%). But for firms that always 
exported or entered overseas markets, the overall impact of increased import penetration 
was to lower the hazard rate (with a one standard deviation increase in ln IMP, the effect 
was between 1.7% and 2.1% lower). Our results therefore suggest that for new and 
continuing exporters, higher levels of intra-industry trade are beneficial. 
Certain other covariates impact on the probability of closure in conjunction with the age 
of the firm; Table 4 reports the parameters of the hazard rate ( ) for just those 
parameters with significant values when age effects are important (four n-tiles were used 
for the AGE variable based on equal numbers of firms in each sub-group). Rather than 
provide a cushion to firms, output growth at the industry level increases the hazard rate of 
closure, but at a much higher rate for the oldest firms (over 60% higher) who are more 
vulnerable to an expansion of the market (which is consistent with the theoretical 
predictions on the role of market size in Asplund and Nocke, 2006).
1ˆ −βe
21 In line with theory 
and past empirical work, increases in capital intensity (a proxy here for sunk costs and 
thus barriers to entry and exit) reduced the hazard rate, but this effect diminished with the 
age of the firm (a one standard deviation increase in ln KL reduced the hazard rate by 
8.2% for the youngest firms, but by only 2.6% for the oldest). Older firms also had lower 
negative hazard rates associated with entering or exiting export markets. In all, Table 4 
shows that when age impacts on hazard rates through other covariates, the general pattern 
                                                 
21 Note we also tried entering ln DISPLACE × ln GROWTH, but the interaction term was not significant. 
 31
is that older firms have relatively higher rates of closure. Thus, conditional on having 
controlled for other covariates associated with productivity (such as size and TFP), we 
find in this study that the oldest UK firms (over 22 years old) are often more vulnerable 
to closure. This may seem at odds with other studies, but it should be noted (Disney et. 
al., 2003a) that in most theoretical models the efficiency level attached to the exit 
threshold that firms must exceed to survive increases with age, and thus the dependence 
of hazard rates on age is therefore an empirical matter.22 
Table 4: Mean parameter estimates eβ−1 by age sub-group in years (based on Table 2) 
 AGE <= 5 5 < AGE <= 11 11 < AGE <= 22 AGE > 22 
ln GROWTHt 0.136 0.186 0.273 0.618 
ln KLit -0.045 -0.041 -0.034 -0.013 
EXP_entryit -0.513 -0.486 -0.440 -0.244 
EXP_exitit -0.200 -0.161 -0.094 -0.179 
ln HERFt 0.004 0.015 0.034 0.096 
 
Counter to expectations, initial size has a positive impact on the hazard rate of closure. 
However, it is possible (following Mata et. al. 1995) to reformulate the results and 
consider the relationship between initial size and growth in employment since the firm 
opened. This results in the relationships shown in Table 5, showing that initial size does 
have a negative impact and assuming that the firm grows from this initial level over time 
there is an additional negative impact on the probability of closure. These results are 
therefore in line with past studies. Current size is more important than initial size for all 
sub-groups (except firms that started exporting), indicating that cet. par. larger firms are 
less likely to close (with values for (eβ-1) in Table 5 showing that for a one standard 
                                                 
22 Studies of family-owned firms (which make up the majority of SME’s in the UK – see Harris and Reid, 
2008) have shown that they often are susceptible to failure and closure when the founder retires (see 
Santarelli and Lotti, 2005). 
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deviation increase in ln EMP, the probability of closure ranges from about 6.9% lower for 
entrants into export markets to 65.2% lower for firms that continuously export).23 
Table 5:Changes in weighted hazard rate of closure due to firm size (initial and current) 
 βˆ  [ln OPENi] z-value βˆ  [ln (EMPit ÷ OPENi)] z-value 
Benchmarka -0.125 -10.88 -0.223 -9.03 
EXP_always -0.228 -13.32 -0.393 -10.57 
EXP_entry -0.090 -2.27 -0.046 -0.58 
EXP_exit -0.281 -6.22 -0.379 -7.74 
a Continuous non-exporters and firms that both entered/exited from export markets. 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
In an attempt to add to the small but growing body of evidence on firm closure 
(particularly in an international context), the weighted FAME panel data for 1997 to 2003 
has been used to estimate a Cox proportional hazard model of firm closure in an open 
economy. Our major findings show that exporting firms have better survival prospects, 
conditional on controlling for other factors linked to productivity: the majority of firms 
engaged in continuous exporting have a lower probability of closure (vis-à-vis those 
producing for domestic market solely); while the hazard rates are unambiguously much 
lower for firms that have entered and/or exited overseas markets. We also find that 
foreign-owned subsidiaries are less likely to close, while having positive intangible assets 
has no significant impact on the hazard rate; unexpectedly, displacement effects (through 
relatively high rates of entry of firms in each industry) decrease the probability of closure 
                                                 
23 Note, the intercept dummies for each 3-digit industry are not reported here but these show that there are 
significant and large differences across sectors. For instance, firms belonging to the textile, leather & 
clothing and repair/sale of motor vehicles sectors were 64.6% and 35.4%, respectively, more likely to exit; 
cet. par, firms in the non-metallic minerals and financial intermediation sectors were 28.4% and 47.6%, 
respectively, less likely to close during the 1997-2003 period. Firms located in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland were between 24.1 – 52.1% more likely to close. 
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rather than leading to displacement of existing firms. Having controlled for other 
attributes associated with productivity (such a size and export status), firms with higher 
total factor productivity are less likely to close. While increased import penetration 
(which is associated with lower trade costs) leads to a higher hazard rate for those firms 
that have never participated in international markets or that exit from exporting, 
interestingly, for firms that have always been exporting or just entered overseas markets, 
increased import penetration leads to a lower hazard rate. Output growth at the industry 
level increases the hazard rate of closure, but at a much higher rate for the oldest firms 
who are more vulnerable to an expansion of the market. In addition, increases in capital 
intensity (a proxy here for sunk costs and thus barriers to entry and exit) reduce the 
hazard rate. 
Overall, and conditional on having controlled for other covariates associated with 
productivity (e.g. size and capital intensity), we find in this study that the oldest UK firms 
(over 22 years old) are often more vulnerable to closure. This is consistent with 
theoretical models showing that the efficiency level attached to the shut-down threshold 
that firms must exceed to survive increases with age; and the initial employment size of a 
firm when it starts-up has a negative impact and assuming that the firm grows from this 
initial level over time there is an additional negative impact on the probability of closure. 
Lastly, industry differences (although not explored in any detail here) are also very 
important in determining the probability of which firms close and which continue in 
business. 
As to the policy dimension, it was stated in the introduction that if closure depends on 
trade costs, public policies might concentrate on reducing these costs.  By contrast, if 
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firm closure is the result of large differences in productivity between exporters and non 
exporters, then polices that concentrate on facilitating entry may not generate lasting 
increases in export participation if they are not accompanied by improvements in firms’ 
productivity. Overall, our results point to firm heterogeneity and thus differences in 
productivity (as measured through a number of variables) being one of the main 
determinants of firm survival, suggesting that export promotion will be most successful if 
it can help firms to become more productive (rather than to just combat market failures 
associated with a lack of information on export markets, or similar barriers to 
internationalisation). However, we have also found that lowering trade costs (and thus 
increasing import penetration) would both encourage (better) exporters and increase the 
probability of non-exporters (with lower productivity) leaving the market place. That is, 
increased global competition should overall push-up UK aggregate productivity (through 
a so-called ‘batting-average’ effect).  
 35
Appendix  
Weighting the FAME data 
Table A.1: GBa turnover (£m) in 2003 based on FAME and ARD by size-bands 
 FAME   FAME 
Size-bandb Unweighted % Weighted % ARD % ARD 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (2) ÷ (3) 
<44 26.9 0.0 460.1 0.0 509.7 0.0 90.0 
44 to 227 380.7 0.0 7,969.6 0.7 8,509.4 0.8 93.5 
>227 to 1184 3,578.5 0.2 60,892.8 5.3 63,751.8 5.9 95.5 
>1184 to 7244 49,683.9 2.4 198,417.1 17.4 200,988.3 18.5 98.7 
>7244 1,988,609.3 97.4 874,543.9 76.5 812,157.0 74.8 107.5 
All 2,042,279.4 100.0 1,142,283.4 100.0 1,085,916.2 100.0 105.0 
a Unweighted FAME data covers the UK b Size-bands are in £’000    Source: ARD and FAME databases 
 
Obtaining estimates of TFP 
To obtain estimate of total factor productivity (TFP), we estimate (using a system-GMM 
panel approach that takes into account endogeneity and sample-selection issues through 
appropriate use of instrumental variables) an augmented production function as follows:  
 titTitKitMitEit Xtkmey εγααααα ++++++= 0                                (A.1) 
where , , , and k  refer to the logarithms of real gross output, employment, 
intermediate inputs and tangible assets in firm i in time t. We have also included a vector 
of variables,
y e m
X , that determine TFP; hence TFP growth in this instance is defined as 
(dropping sub-scripts):  
           ln                                           (A.2) kmeyXPFT KMET  αααγα ˆˆˆˆˆ −−−≡+=
Details (and results) are provided in Harris and Li (2007). 
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